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BOOK REVIEWS
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, by Giorgio Del Vecchio, translated by Thomas Owen Martin. The
Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D. C., 1953. Pp. xxiii-461. $6.50, cloth.
Reviewed by
WILLIAM F. CAHILL*
Professor Del Vecchio's lectures on the
Philosophy of Law are here published for
the first time in English. Even before 1930,
when the first printed edition appeared in
Italian, the lectures circulated widely and
spread everywhere the fame of their author.
They have since been translated into eight
other languages. The author's reputation for
broad inquiry, acute analysis and clarity of
exposition will be further enhanced by the
present lucid and graceful translation.
The introduction describes the concept
and functions of Philosophy of Law, indi-
cates its relations to other sciences, and out-
lines its methods. In this brilliantly succinct
essay, one cannot fail to perceive a mind
whose breadth and profundity returns al-
ways to that disciplined harmony which is
the hallmark of integrated education.
The body of the work has two major
divisions. The first of these comprises over
two hundred pages devoted to a summary
history of the Philosophy of Law. The ex-
pogitions of the teachings of the Greek phil-
osophers, of Grotius, Hobbes, Thomasius,
Rousseau, and Kant, are especially notable,
as well for the accuracy of their material as
for the clear precision of their expression.
The studies on St. Thomas Aquinas and
Suarez are the best work of the author in
*A. B., Manhattan College (1932); J. C. D., Lat-
eran University (1952); Professor of Comparative
Law, St. John's University School of Law.
his appraisal of Catholic writers. Yet, even
in these essays, and particularly in that on
St. Thomas, there is to be desired a better
application of the author's acknowledged
powers. His neglect to present, either in this
historical or in the later doctrinal section,
even a summary of the work of the Fathers
of the Church who adapted and developed
the natural law doctrines of the Roman
jurists, seems a serious omission. Nor is it
a mere oversight, for he says "only in the
age of the Renaissance . . . was the classic
doctrine reaffirmed according to which Law
is derived from human nature independently
of Theology".' That the classical doctrine
never went beyond human nature, and that
the Fathers and Scholastics made all depend
on premises of revelation, are implications
which the author does not attempt to justify.
No indication is made of the contributions
of Gratian and other medieval writers to
the development of the doctrine on custom
as a source of law. Bracton is not even
named, and we feel he should be, both for
his recognized doctrinal contributions and
for his enormous influence upon the devel-
opment of law in the English-speaking coun-
tries. The presentation of modem writers
on the Philosophy of Law includes a useful
list of names of writers and their works.
For the nations other than Italy, there is
little more.
I DEL VECCHIO, PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 46 (8th ed.,
Martin transl. 1953).
BOOK REVIEWS
The second major division of the work is
the "Systematic Treatise." It begins with a
section in which consideration is given to
the concept of law - a section so well or-
ganized as to be most interesting and in-
structive. The careful reader will note,
however, that all absolute concepts, that of
justice included, are made to depend upon
the Kantian postulate of a priori ideas.2
While the importance of motive in deter-
mining the juridical quality of acts is well
demonstrated, the author goes too far when
he extends the field of law to all human
actions, even internal ones. 3
The treatment of the origins and histori-
cal evolution of law in the second section
of the "Systematic Treatise" covers only
twenty-four pages. The consequently com-
pendious quality of its statements leaves
much room for distinctions, qualifications,
additions and positive emendations, if the
reader is to form an objective view of these
problems.
In the last section of the "Systematic
Treatise," on the rational foundation of
law, Del Vecchio discusses the chief adver-
saries of his position, and presents his own
views on "human nature as foundation of
law." To nearly everything he says of natural
law, and of its relation to positive law, we
can assent.4 As an "absolutist," he rejects
2 DEL VECCIO, op. cit. supra note 1, at 252-255.
3 DEL VECCHIO, op. cit. supra note 1, at 255-260.
St. Thomas distinguishes thus: " . . . there is no
virtue whose exercise the law cannot command.
But human law does not prescribe all the acts of
all the virtues." SUMMA THEOLOGICA I-I, q.96,a.3,
c. (Emphasis added.) And the reason St. Thomas
offers for this distinction is pregnant with impli-
cations ".. . to the political community, man is
not ordained in the totality of his being nor in the
totality of his resources." SUMMA THEOLOGICA I-II,
q.21, a.4, ad 3.
4 See Graneris, Book Review (5th and 8th ed.),
20 APOLLINARIS 148 (1947), 25 APOLLINARIS 440
the jurisprudential philosophies of Skepti-
cism, Empirical Realism, the Historical
School, and Utilitarianism.
From his statement of the ultimate ra-
tional basis of law, that law is an "a priori
form of the spirit," we dissent. Moderate
realism, asserting that experience is the ulti-
mate basis of all ideas - that the intellect
abstracts the universal from the particular
which is known by experience, cannot ac-
cept any ideas as innate.5
Del Vecchio calls "theologists" 6 all those
who trace a necessary relation between God
and the law. For him, the "theologist" point
of view has two forms: it identifies law with
the will of the divinity, or it postulates a di-
vine reason which determines what is just -
that determination is adopted by the divine
will and must be accepted by men. He is not
satisfied that either is truly rational, for the
first prescinds from reason, and the second
offends by invoking reason in reference to
the divinity which "is, by definition, absolute
and superior to reason, consequently it must
be accepted only as such, thanks to faith."
This view, that the existence and nature of
God are not knowable by reason is, of
course, contrary to Thomistic philosophy
and even to Catholic doctrine. It has its
philosophical root in the Kantian view that
the principle of causality is valid only in the
world of phenomena.7
It is true that much of Del Vecchio's phil-
osophy of law, when it descends to more
(1952); see also Book Note (3d ed.), 10 APOLLI-
NARIS 301 (1937).
5 The view here criticized was expressed in the
third Italian edition. See 10 APOLLINARIS 301
(1937).
6 Msgr. Graneris noted that Del Vecchio began, in
the fifth Italian edition, to use the term "theologist"
instead of "theological" to describe these points of
view. 20 APOLLINARIS 148 (1947).
7 DEL VECCHIO, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 432-433 (8th
ed., Martin transl. 1953).
particular problems, is acceptable to the
Thomist and the Catholic. Yet it would be
erroneous to assume that his metaphysical
absolutism has no influence in his evaluation
of matters which may seem remote from
criteriology and theodicy. When Del Vec-
chio discussed 8 the problem of whether a
man might ever, in any circumstances, dis-
simulate, he was led - by his metaphysically
absolute commitment to truth -to deny that
dissimulation is ever virtuous or even mor-
ally admissible. In a work9 which clearly
manifested Del Vecchio's devotion to fascist
theory, 0 he discussed the need for a moral
as well as a legal bond among the citizens
of a state. And he described the moral bond
in these terms: "an identity of wills, a true
communion of minds, a single order of faith
in the civil religion of the Fatherland." It
seems that a metaphysical absolutist who is
offended by postulates of divine reason as
8 DEL VECCHIO, VERITA E INGANNO NELLA MORALE
E NEL DIRITTO (1947), Palazzini, Book Review, 20
APOLLINARIS 149 (1947). The work has been
translated into English: Truth and Untruth in
Morals and Law (Knease transl.) in INTERPRETA-
TIONS OF MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES, ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF ROSCOE POUND 143-166 (Sayre ed.
1947).
9 DEL VECCHIO, SULLA STATUTALITA DEL DIRiT-ro
(1929), translated: On the Statuality of Law, 19
J. COMP. LEG. & INT'L L. (3d ser.) 1-20 (1937).
10 See Cicognani, Book Review, 3 APOLLINARIS
148 (1930).
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the ultimate basis of law may find himself
worshipping idols.
If we had in English an adequate litera-
ture of the Thomistic philosophy of law,
the present work would be most welcome
as illustrating interesting parallels erected
upon a different epistemological founda-
tion." But in the confusion of views and
expressions now prevailing in the English
writings on natural law, one may be per-
mitted to suggest that by seeming to promote
alliances which are ambiguous,"2 natural law
philosophers may impede rather than ad-
vance the development of jurisprudence on
a sound philosophical basis.
11 Of the eighth Italian edition Msgr. Graneris had
only this to say: "There is no need for us to discuss
the work of Del Vecchio, for its acceptance is evi-
denced by the frequency of successive editions. His
doctrine is well known, and agrees with our own in
many respects." 25 APOLLNARIs 440 (1952).
12 The reviews of earlier Italian editions of Del
Vecchio's PHILOSOPHY OF LAW and of his other
works, pointed out the subjective character of his
philosophical foundations. See Graneris, Book
Review, Del Vecchio, Die Gerechtigkeit, 14 APOL-
LINARIS 463 (1941) [this work has been translated
into English by Lady Guthrie: DEL VECCHIO,
JUSTICE (1952)]; Book Note: Lezioni di filosofia
del diritto (3d ed.), 10 APOLLINARIS 301 (1937).
Msgr. Graneris pointed out the difficulties created
by Del Vecchio's Kantian terminology even in
matters where the author's doctrine seemed un-
exceptionable. Graneris, Book Review, Del Vec-
chio, Lezioni di filosofia del diritto (5th ed.), 20
APOLLNARIS 148 (1947).
